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& In this fMRI study, we investigated the development be-
tween adolescence and adulthood of the neural processing
of social emotions. Unlike basic emotions (such as disgust and
fear), social emotions (such as guilt and embarrassment) re-
quire the representation of another’s mental states. Nineteen
adolescents (10–18 years) and 10 adults (22–32 years) were
scanned while thinking about scenarios featuring either social
or basic emotions. In both age groups, the anterior rostral
medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) was activated during social
versus basic emotion. However, adolescents activated a lateral
part of the MPFC for social versus basic emotions, whereas
adults did not. Relative to adolescents, adults showed higher
activity in the left temporal pole for social versus basic emo-
tions. These results show that, although the MPFC is activated
during social emotion in both adults and adolescents, ado-
lescents recruit anterior (MPFC) regions more than do adults,
and adults recruit posterior (temporal) regions more than do
adolescents. &
INTRODUCTION
Adolescence is a period of social and psychological de-
velopment during which social awareness and behavior
undergo profound change (Brown, 2004; Eisenberg &
Morris, 2004). As well as alterations in hormone levels
and social environment, another possible cause of these
changes in social behavior could be the anatomical de-
velopment in brain areas involved in social cognition,
including the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), the supe-
rior temporal cortex, and the temporo-parietal junc-
tion (TPJ) (Shaw et al., 2008; Gogtay et al., 2004; Giedd
et al., 1999; Sowell et al., 1999). In addition, a number
of recent functional neuroimaging studies have shown
that activity within brain regions associated with so-
cial cognition changes between adolescence and adult-
hood (Blakemore, den Ouden, Choudhury, & Frith,
2007; Moriguchi, Ohnishi, Mori, Matsuda, & Komaki,
2007; Pfeifer, Lieberman, & Dapretto, 2007; Wang, Lee,
Sigman, & Dapretto, 2006; see Blakemore, 2008 for
a meta-analysis). These previous developmental func-
tional neuroimaging studies have focused on neural
activity associated with the attribution of mental states
such as intentions and beliefs (‘‘mentalizing’’). The
current fMRI study was designed to investigate whether
a similar developmental change in activation pattern oc-
curs for mentalizing in an emotional context. To this
end, we investigated changes in brain activity between
adolescence and adulthood during social emotion pro-
cessing. Social emotions are defined here as emotions
that require the representation of mental states. Exam-
ples are embarrassment, guilt, shame, and pride. In
order to feel embarrassment, for example, you must rep-
resent someone else’s belief that you have acted foolishly.
In contrast, basic emotions such as disgust and fear only
require the awareness of one’s own somatic state.
It has consistently been observed in adults that men-
talizing tasks, which require participants to attribute be-
liefs, intentions, or desires, activate a set of brain regions
including the anterior rostral MPFC, the posterior supe-
rior temporal sulcus (pSTS)/TPJ, and the temporal poles
(Frith, 2007; Frith & Frith, 2003; Saxe & Kanwisher,
2003). When adults reflect upon social emotions such
as guilt and embarrassment, components of the ‘‘men-
talizing network,’’ including the anterior rostral MPFC,
are active (Moll, Zahn, de Oliveira-Souza, Krueger, &
Grafman, 2005; Takahashi et al., 2004; Berthoz, Armony,
Blair, & Dolan, 2002; Moll et al., 2002; Shin et al., 2000).
Olsson and Ochsner (2008) recently discussed the over-
lap between regions of the brain involved in social cog-
nition and in emotion processing, and they suggest that
mental state attribution plays a role in learning about
and understanding emotions.
Recent developmental fMRI studies of social cogni-
tion have consistently found differential activity within
the mentalizing network in adolescents and adults (see
Blakemore, 2008). Thinking about how one’s own inten-
tions would lead to specific actions was found to recruit
the anterior rostral MPFC more strongly in adolescents
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(Blakemore et al., 2007). In contrast, adults activated
posterior regions (right STS) more than did adolescents
when thinking about intentions. A similar developmen-
tal shift in brain activity was found with a task based on
decoding communicative intentions (Wang et al., 2006).
When adolescents (aged 9 to 14 years) and adults (aged
23–33 years) judged whether a series of ironic com-
munications were sincere or not, adolescents showed
stronger activation of the anterior rostral MPFC than did
adults. Adults activated posterior regions including the
superior temporal and fusiform gyri more. In another
developmental study that focused on the processing
of self-related sentences, children (aged 9.5–10.8 years)
and adults (aged 23–31.7 years) read phrases about aca-
demic skills and social competence (Pfeifer et al., 2007).
In the self condition, participants were asked to indi-
cate whether the phrases accurately described them.
In the other condition, they were asked to indicate
whether the phrases accurately described a fictional,
familiar other person (Harry Potter). The MPFC and
the ACC were more active in children than in adults
during self-knowledge retrieval compared with other-
knowledge retrieval. The authors suggested that, com-
pared with adults, adolescents might rely more on
‘‘on-line’’ self-reflective processing performed by the
MPFC. Thus, these studies have consistently shown that
activity in the MPFC during mental state understand-
ing decreases between adolescence and adulthood,
whereas activity in the temporal lobes shows the op-
posite developmental pattern. The current study was
designed to investigate whether the same developmen-
tal shift in activation pattern occurs for social emotion
processing.
Displays of social emotions such as guilt and embar-
rassment are seen within the first 3 years of life (see
Eisenberg, 2000 for a review). The ability to describe sit-
uations in which a social emotion will be experienced
emerges at around age 7 (Harris, Olthof, Terwogt, &
Hardman, 1987) and, by adolescence, the experience
of social emotion permeates everyday social exchange
(Zeman, Cassano, Perry-Parrish, & Stegall, 2006; Elkind
& Bower, 1979). However, at around puberty, children
become increasingly aware of and concerned with peo-
ple’s opinions of them (Parker et al., 2006; Adams &
Berzonsky, 2003; Elkind, 1967), and the self-concept
depends more and more upon perceived social rep-
utation (Davey, Yu ¨cel, & Allen, 2008). This increase
in self-consciousness after puberty, as well as the in-
creased concern with others’ (especially peers’) opin-
ions, might result in an increase in the frequency and
intensity of the experience of social emotions (Zeman
et al., 2006). At the same time, socialization experiences
with parents and peers mean that adolescence is a key
time for learning about how these emotions should
be expressed in different social contexts (Zeman &
Shipman, 1997).
It is unknown whether the neural correlates of social
emotion processing develop between adolescence and
adulthood. To investigate this question, we scanned 19
adolescents (aged 10–18 years) and 10 adults (aged 23–
32 years) as they read a series of sentences that were
designed to elicit either a social emotion (guilt or em-
barrassment) or a basic emotion (disgust or fear). We
predicted that thinking about social versus basic emo-
tion scenarios would activate components of the social
brain network, including the anterior rostral MPFC, in
both age groups (Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, et al., 2005;
Moll, Zahn, et al., 2005; Takahashi et al., 2004; Moll et al.,
2002). We further predicted that adolescents would ac-
tivate the MPFC more for social compared with basic
emotion than adults would, as has been found in pre-
vious developmental studies of mentalizing (Blakemore
et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2006).
The scenarios presented to participants in the scanner
pertained either to the self or to another person (the
participant’s mother). We included this additional factor
for two reasons. First, in adults, there is a difference in
neural activity when thinking about emotion in the first-
versus third-person perspective (Ruby & Decety, 2004).
Second, a recent developmental fMRI study (Pfeifer et al.,
2007) has shown that the neural correlates of self/other
semantic knowledge retrieval (deciding whether state-
ments such as ‘‘I like reading,’’ apply to the self, or to
Harry Potter) differentially activate components of the
mentalizing network in adults compared to children.
Specifically, self versus other retrieval was associated with
greater activity in the MPFC in adolescents, and greater
activity in the lateral temporal cortex in adults. Because
we were specifically interested in these brain regions,
we decided to use self/other versions of each emotional
scenario to investigate whether a similar developmental
pattern would be seen for self/other processing of emo-
tional scenarios. Our choice of participants’ mother as
the protagonist in the ‘‘other’’ condition was motivated
by a need to select an ‘‘other’’ who would be distinct
from the self, but sufficiently familiar to participants that
they would be able to adopt her emotional perspective
(cf. Ruby & Decety, 2004). To investigate how similar
each participant perceived herself to be to her mother,
participants completed two versions (self and mother) of
the NEO-V Factor Personality Inventory. The absence of
group differences in this measure indicates that any group
differences in brain activity between the self and other
condition was not due to group differences in the per-
ceived similarity of participants’ mothers to themselves.
We included only female participants in the study for
the following reasons. First, sex differences have been
observed in various measures of brain anatomy, includ-
ing in brain regions involved in emotion and social cogni-
tion (Schmithorst, Holland, & Dardzinski, 2008; Lenroot
et al., 2007). Specifically, there are significant differ-
ences between the sexes in terms of the age at which
gray matter volume peaks in the frontal and parietal
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Giedd et al., 1999). Second, sex differences have been
observed in fMRI studies of emotion in adolescents and
adults (Yurgelun-Todd & Killgore, 2006; Hall, Witelson,
Szechtman, & Nahmias, 2004; Killgore & Yurgelun-Todd,
2004) and in studies of social emotion processing in
adults (Moll, Zahn, et al., 2005; Moll, de Oliveira-Souza,
et al., 2002). Our choice of females was related to the es-
tablished sex differences in expressing emotion: Females
are more expressive of emotions than males (Kring &
Gordon, 2007). This difference in emotion expression
between the sexes becomes accentuated with age during
childhood, as sex-specific, culturally defined rules for the
expression of emotion are learned (see Brody, 1985, for
a review). Therefore, the relationship between feeling
and expressing emotions differs between the sexes and
changes with age in a sex-specific way.
METHODS
Participants
Nineteen female adolescents (10.83–18.17 years; mean =
14.8 years) and 10 female adults (22.92–31.83 years;
mean = 26.41 years), with no history of psychiatric or
neurological disorder, took part in the study. Partici-
pants were all female, in consideration of the significant
sex differences in the neuroanatomical changes that take
place during adolescence (Giedd et al., 1999), which
may impact on neural processing. Written informed
consent was obtained prior to the study from all adult
participants, and from a parent or guardian of partic-
ipants younger than 18 years. The study was approved
by the UCL National Hospital for Neurology and Neuro-
surgery Ethics Committee.
To ensure a consistent level of intelligence between
groups, the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence
(WASI, 1999) was administered to participants. Mean
(±SD) full-scale IQ (FSIQ) was 115.52 (±6.63) for the ad-
olescent group and 111.14 (±14.10) for the adult group.
An independent-samples t test revealed that there was
no significant difference in FSIQ between groups [t(22) =
1.052, p > .3]. Three adult participants did not complete
the WASI, but because they had completed university-
l e v e le d u c a t i o n ,t h e i rl e v e lo fi n t e l l i g e n c ew a sj u d g e dt o
be comparable to that of the other participants.
Experimental Design
The fMRI experiment was split into two 12-min ses-
sions. Within each session, each participant underwent
277 scans. We employed a 2  2  2 mixed factorial
design, comprising within-subjects factors emotion (so-
cial vs. basic) and protagonist (self vs. other), and
between-subjects factor group (adolescent vs. adult).
Participants read 144 emotional sentences describing
social or basic emotion scenarios pertaining either to
the self or to their mother (see Table 1 for examples of
scenarios). After reading each scenario, participants
rated to what extent the protagonist would feel a given
emotion, on a discrete rating scale from 1 (not at all)t o
4( very much), using a button box.
Table 1. Examples of Social (Embarrassment, Guilt) and Basic
(Disgust, Fear) Emotion Scenarios from the Self Condition
Emotion Sentence
Social: Embarrassment ‘‘Your dad started doing rock n’ roll
dances in the supermarket’’
‘‘You were quietly picking your nose
but your friend saw you’’
‘‘You tripped over in front of a boy
you liked’’
‘‘Your friend said you had a wet patch
on your backside all the way home’’
‘‘Your were eating with your friend
and you dribbled down your top’’
Social: Guilt ‘‘You laughed at a quiet girl you
know and it made her sad’’
‘‘You laughed when your friend
told you she was feeling upset’’
‘‘You pretended to be sick so you
don’t have to visit your gran’’
‘‘You joined in when people were
laughing at your best friend’’
‘ ‘ Y o ul i e dt oy o u rd a dw h e ny o u
wanted to go out with your friend’’
Basic: Disgust ‘‘Your friend was vomiting next to
you and you could smell it’’
‘ ‘ Y o uw e r ei ny o u rf r i e n d ’ sg a r d e na n d
you put your hand in slimy cat poo’’
‘‘You saw a big hairy fly laying eggs
on your friend’s lunch’’
‘‘Your dad told you that the fridge
w a si n f e s t e dw i t hm a g g o t s ’ ’
‘‘You saw a pile of rotting guts near
the dustbin at your friend’s house’’
Basic: Fear ‘‘Your friend screamed that there
was a wasp inside your jumper’’
‘‘An angry dog was barking and running
towards you and your friend’’
‘‘You suddenly woke up as someone
screamed by your bed’’
‘‘Your dad slammed on the brakes
as a lorry hurtled towards you’’
‘ ‘ Y o uw e r ew i t hy o u rf r i e n da n da
creature ran up your neck’’
Sentences from the Other condition described the same scenarios but
featuring ‘‘Your Mom’’.
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Each scenario featured either a social emotion or a basic
emotion. The social emotions were embarrassment and
guilt, and the basic emotions were disgust and fear.
The emotion sentences were chosen from a larger set
that was presented in the form of a questionnaire to a
number of adolescent and adult volunteers. These vol-
unteers, who were different from the participants in the
current study, rated their emotional response to the emo-
tion sentences. Sentences that were rated highly by both
age groups were chosen for use in this fMRI study. In
addition, the sentences were designed to maximize the
difference in mentalizing between social and basic con-
ditions. Therefore, the basic emotion sentences featured
immediate, visceral disgust- and fear-evoking situations.
Both social and basic scenarios featured the protago-
nist plus one other person. This ensured that the differ-
ence between the social and basic emotion conditions
was the need to take into account another person’s men-
tal state, not the mere presence of another person in the
scenario.
Protagonist Factor
The protagonist in each scenario was either the partici-
pant (self) or the participant’s mother (other). The same
emotional sentences were used for the self and other
conditions. We ascertained that all participants had a liv-
ing, healthy mother.
The mean (plus the range) word length, and the
number of clauses, was equated between all emotion
conditions and both protagonist conditions. Sentences
were presented in blocks of three. Participants had
9 sec to read silently, imagine, and rate their response
to each emotion sentence. The experiment was blocked
by emotion and protagonist such that within a block,
all three scenarios featured the same emotion (disgust,
embarrassment, fear, or guilt) and the same protago-
nist (self or other). At the start of each block, a 1-sec
cue screen informed participants which emotion and
which protagonist the proceeding three sentences would
feature.
Each 12-min session of the fMRI experiment contained
24 emotion blocks, each lasting 28 sec. The stimulus
materials were blocked by emotion and protagonist to
maximize the strength of the imagined emotions, while
minimizing carryover effects between sentences fea-
turing different emotions/protagonists. Condition order
was fully randomized. In addition, there were two 28-sec
visual fixation blocks per session, occurring one third
and two thirds of the way through each of the two ses-
sions. Stimulus presentation was programmed in Cogent
(www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent/index.html) running in
Matlab 6.5, which recorded participant responses.
Prior to scanning, all participants completed a practice
session consisting of four scenarios from each of the
emotions. The sentences used in the practice task did
not appear inside the scanner.
Participants’ Perceived Similarity to Mother
To quantify any age-related differences in participants’
perceived similarity to their mothers, which might cause
between-group differences in brain activity in the pro-
tagonist condition, participants’ perceived similarity to
their mothers was quantified by administering two sepa-
rate versions of the NEO-V personality questionnaire
(Costa & McCrae, 1991), after the scanning session.
The two questionnaires were identical except that in
one version participants answered personality questions
about themselves, and in the other version they an-
swered the same questions about their mother.
Data Acquisition
A 1.5-T Siemens Sonata head MRI scanner was used
to acquire both 3-D T1-weighted fast-field echo struc-
tural images and multislice T2*-weighted echo-planar
volumes with blood oxygenation level dependent con-
trast. Each functional brain volume was composed of
thirty-three 3-mm axial slices with a 1.5-mm gap and in-
plane resolution of 3 * 3 mm, angled at 308 to cover the
whole brain and minimize signal dropout from the fa-
cial sinuses. Repetition time was 3 sec. Functional data
were acquired in two scanning sessions of approximately
12 min each, in which a total of 554 volumes were ac-
quired, or 277 scans per session. The acquisition of a
T1-weighted anatomical image occurred after the two
functional scanning sessions for each participant. The
total duration of scanning was approximately 35 min per
participant.
Data Analysis
Behavioral and fMRI data were analyzed by collapsing
the four emotions—embarrassment and guilt, disgust
and fear—into two emotion conditions, social and basic.
This was because our hypothesis related to differential
neural effects of social versus basic emotion, not to the
neural effects of specific emotions.
Behavioral data (emotion ratings) were analyzed with
SPSS. Main effects of emotion and protagonist in both
groups, as well as two- and three-way interactions be-
tween emotion, protagonist, and group, were analyzed
usingmixed-modelrepeated measures ANOVA with within-
subjects factors emotion and protagonist and between-
subjects factor group. We used a significance threshold of
p < .05.
Imaging data were analyzed using SPM2 (www.fil.ion.
ucl.ac.uk/spm). The first six functional image volumes
from each run were discarded to allow for T1 equilibrium
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processing included rigid-body transformation (realign-
ment) and slice timing to correct for head movement
and slice acquisition delays. The images were then
stereotactically normalized into the standard space de-
fined by the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) tem-
plate using the mean of the functional volumes, and
smoothed with a Gaussian filter of 6 mm full width at
half maximum to increase the signal-to-noise ratio and
to facilitate group analyses. The time series for each
participant were high-pass filtered at 128 sec to remove
low-frequency drifts.
The analysis of the functional imaging data entailed
the creation of statistical parametric maps representing a
statistical assessment of hypothesized condition-specific
effects (Friston et al., 1994), which were estimated with
the general linear model. The effects of interest were
the four scenario block types (2 emotion * 2 protago-
nist) and the visual fixation blocks. We also modeled the
six realignment parameters as effects of no interest,
in order to account for any group differences in head
movement. Each component of the model served as a
regressor in a multiple regression analysis for each
participant. The resulting parameter estimates for each
regressor at each voxel were then entered into a second-
level analysis, where ‘‘participant’’ served as a random
effect in a within-subjects ANOVA, enabling population
inferences to be made.
The main effects and interactions between conditions
were specified by appropriately weighted linear con-
trasts, and determined using the t statistic on a voxel-
by-voxel basis. Statistical analysis at the second level was
performed for each group separately to examine the
main effect of all scenarios versus fixation to check that
expected brain regions were activated in this contrast.
In order to test our main hypotheses, we first investi-
gated the three-way interaction between emotion, pro-
tagonist, and group. A significant result then allowed us
to perform a series of planned t contrasts to investigate
main effects of condition for the two groups separately
and two-way interactions between group and condition.
Specifically, for each group separately, we looked at the
main effect of emotion (social > basic, basic > social)
and protagonist (self > other, other > self). We also
investigated interactions between group and emotion
[adult (social > basic)–adolescent (social > basic), and
vice versa] and group and protagonist [adult (self >
other)–adolescent (self > other), and vice versa]. We
also looked at the interaction between protagonist and
emotion in each group separately [adult ([self > other]–
[social > basic] and vice versa; adolescent ([self > other]–
[social > basic]) and vice versa].
Statistical contrasts were used to create an SPM{t},
which was transformed into an SPM{Z} and thresholded
at p < .05 (corrected on the basis of the theory of ran-
dom Gaussian fields for multiple comparisons across
the whole brain volume examined). We report regions
that survive correction at p < .05, as well as activations
within regions for which we had an a priori hypothesis
and which survived small-volume correction (SVC; 12 mm
radius sphere, unless otherwise specified) at p <. 0 5 .
These regions were the MPFC (Blakemore et al., 2007;
Gilbert et al., 2006, 8 mm), the pSTS/TPJ (Aichhorn,
P e r n e r ,K r o n b i c h l e r ,S t a f f e n ,&L a d u r n e r ,2 0 0 6 ;F r i t h&
Frith, 2003), the temporal pole (Blakemore et al., 2007;
8 mm), and the precuneus (Blakemore et al., 2007) for
social versus basic emotion; the anterior insula (Moll
et al., 2002) and the inferior frontal gyrus (Moll, de
Oliveira-Souza, et al., 2005; Moll, Zahn, et al., 2005) for
basic versus social emotion; the postcentral gyrus for
self versus other (Ruby & Decety, 2004); and the me-
dial fronto-polar gyrus, the left STS, the left temporal
pole, the posterior cingulate gyrus, and the right infe-





Participants rated to what extent the protagonist of
each scenario would feel a given emotion, on a discrete
rating scale from 1 (not at all)t o4( very much). Mixed-
design, repeated measures 2  2  2 ANOVA showed
that mean emotion ratings did not differ between groups
[F(1, 26) = 0.60; p > .4; see Table 2]. There were
no significant two- or three-way interactions between
age group and the factors emotion and protagonist (all
p > .2). For both groups, basic emotion scenarios were
given higher ratings than social emotion scenarios [F(1,
Table 2. Mean and Standard Deviation of the Emotion
Ratings (from 1 to 4), by Group (Adult, Adolescent),
Emotion (Social, Basic), and Protagonist (Self, Other)
Emotion Protagonist Group Mean
Standard
Deviation
Social Self Adult 2.98 0.349
Adolescent 2.94 0.397
Other Adult 3.34 0.343
Adolescent 3.07 0.514
Basic Self Adult 3.16 0.283
Adolescent 3.11 0.417
Other Adult 3.29 0.395
Adolescent 3.24 0.427
Ratings for basic emotions were significantly higher than for social emo-
tions, and ratings for other emotions were significantly higher than for
self emotions. However, there were no significant group differences and
no significant interactions.
1740 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 21, Number 926) = 9.44, p < .01], and other scenarios were given
higher intensity ratings than self scenarios [F(1, 26) =
4.47, p < .05].
Perceived Self–Mother Difference
Data were not available for one adult participant. For
the remaining participants, perceived self–mother differ-
ence (PSMD) scores were computed by calculating the
square root of the summed squared self–mother dif-
ferences for all five dimensions of the NEO-V ‘‘self’’
and ‘‘mother’’ personality questionnaires. This yielded
PSMD scores ranging from 5.57 to 37.03 (mean ± SD =
20.34 ± 9.14). A median test of the PSMD scores re-
vealed no difference between adult and adolescent par-
ticipant groups (x
2 =0 ,p > .99). Linear regression
revealed no relationship between age and PSMD score
(r
2 = .009, p > .6).
Functional Imaging Data
Data from both imaging runs of one adolescent partici-
pant and one run of a second adolescent participant were
excluded due to excessive head movement (>5 mm).
After this, there were no statistical differences in mean
movement between the two age groups for any of the
six dimensions of movement [independent-samples t tests
(df =2 6 ) :a l lp > .15]. We report group-level activations
in hypothesized regions that survived SVC at p <. 0 5 .
Main Effect of Sentences vs. Visual Fixation
In both adult and adolescent groups, the main effect of
all scenarios versus visual fixation resulted in expected
activation of visual and motor areas, as well as areas
involved in reading (Figure 1).
Three-way Interaction between Emotion, Protagonist,
and Group
The three-way interaction between protagonist (self >
other), emotion (social > basic), and group (adult >
adolescent) yielded a significant region of activation in
the left TPJ (MNI coordinates [42 68 44]; Z = 3.60,
p < .05 SVC; Figure 2, top left. For illustration purposes,
parameter estimates are shown relative to fixation base-
line). Activity in this region was driven by a main effect
of social > basic emotion in adolescents, and an inter-
action between emotion and protagonist in the adult
group (Figure 2, bottom). The opposite contrast with
respect to group (adolescent > adult, social > basic,
self > other) did not yield any significant activations.
Main Effect of Emotion in Each Group
In the adult group, the main effect of social > basic emo-
tion resulted in activation of the anterior rostral MPFC,
the left pSTS/TPJ, and the left temporal pole (Table 3,
Figure 3). In the adolescent group, the main effect of
social emotion (social > basic) resulted in activation of
the anterior rostral MPFC, the left and right pSTS/TPJ,
and the precuneus (Table 3, Figure 3).
Interactions between Group and Emotion
To identify differences in brain activity to social versus
basic emotion between groups, we tested for significant
interactions between group (adult, adolescent) and emo-
tion (social, basic).
[Adult (social > basic)–adolescent (social > basic)].
This analysis revealed a cluster in the left temporal pole
(Table 3, Figure 4). Inspection of the parameter esti-
mates, as well as inclusive masking (with adult social >
basic), showed that this region was activated more to
social than to basic emotion in adults, and more to basic
than to social emotion in adolescents (Figure 3).
[Adolescent (social > basic)–adult (social > basic)].
A cluster in left lateral anterior rostral MPFC (Table 3,
Figure 5) was activated by the contrast [adolescent (so-
cial > basic)–adult (social > basic)]. Inspection of the
parameter estimates, as well as inclusive masking (with
adolescent social > basic), showed that this region
was activated more to social than to basic emotion in
adolescents, and more to basic than to social emotion
in adults (Figure 5).
Figure 1. Main effect of scenarios versus visual fixation in adult and
adolescent groups (adult image shown at p < .05, fully corrected
across the whole brain, with minimum spatial extent = 10 voxels;
adolescent image shown at p < .01, fully corrected across the whole
brain, with minimum spatial extent = 10 voxels).
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In the adult group, the main effect of self (self > other)
did not yield any significant activations. In the adolescent
group, the main effect of self (self > other) resulted in
activation of the left postcentral gyrus (Table 3). The main
effect of other (other > self) did not yield any significant
activations in either the adult or the adolescent group.
Interactions between Protagonist and Group
No brain regions showed a significant interaction between
protagonist and group.
Interactions between Emotion and Protagonist
To identify differences in brain activity to social versus
basic emotion which differed as a function of protago-
nist (self, other), we tested for significant interactions
between emotion (social, basic) and protagonist (self,
other) for each group separately.
Adult [(self social > self basic)–(other social > other
basic)]. The adult group activated the left TPJ in this
contrast (Table 3; Figure 2, top left). At a less stringent
threshold ( p < .001 uncorrected), the adult group ac-
tivated an anterodorsal portion of the MPFC for this
contrast (Table 3; Figure 6, top left). Inspection of the
parameter estimates, as well as inclusive masking (with
social > basic for self only; and basic > social for other
only), showed that the MPFC region was more active
in self-social emotions than in any other condition (Fig-
ure 6, bottom left). In contrast, the left TPJ was more
active in self-social emotions and other-basic emotions
than in the other conditions (shown in the graph in
Figure 2).
Adolescent [(self social > self basic)–(other social >
other basic)]. At a less stringent threshold ( p < .001
uncorrected), the adolescent group showed activity
within a similarly anterodorsal region of the MPFC for
this contrast (Table 3; Figure 6, top right). Inspection
of the parameter estimates, as well as inclusive masking
(with social > basic for self only; and basic > social for
other only), showed that the MPFC region was more
active in self-social emotions than in any other condi-
tion (Figure 6, bottom right).
Figure 2. Three-way
interaction between emotion,
protagonist, and group in the
left TPJ, shown at p < .001 on a
sagittal glass brain projection.
Parameter estimates for each
condition relative to fixation
are shown for each group.
This region of the left TPJ is
most active in adult self-social
emotions and other-basic
emotions, and in adolescent
self- and other-social emotions.
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3) for Regions of Activation in the Three-way Interaction between
Emotion, Protagonist, and Group, the Interaction between Emotion and Group, the Main Effect of Emotion in Each Group,
and the Interaction between Protagonist and Group
Contrast Region of Activation MNI Coordinates Z Size in mm
3 at p < .001
Interaction between emotion,
protagonist, and group
Left TPJ (for contrast, see Figure 2) 42 68 44 3.60 264
52 58 34 3.50 40
Emotion: social > basic Adult
Anterior rostral MPFC 14 44 2 3.82 96
4 48 18 3.56 216
6 42 12 3.28 (part of above cluster)
Left pSTS/TPJ 56 62 28 3.48 32
Left temporal pole 36 8 30 3.43 24
Adolescent
Anterior rostral MPFC 10 52 18 4.13 1600
66 22 2 4.03 (part of above cluster)
45 02 8 3.64 (part of above cluster)
18 42 16 3.65 128
45 28 3.43 64
16 48 34 3.37 40
Precuneus 4 56 28 4.64 1360
14 56 34 3.49 (part of above cluster)
4 62 40 3.32 64
Left TPJ 38 66 42 4.00 2032
48 62 36 3.98 (part of above cluster)
38 62 32 3.62 (part of above cluster)
Right pSTS/TPJ 44 48 28 3.31 40
Interaction between emotion
and group
[Adult (social > basic)–adolescent (social > basic)]
Left temporal pole 40 6 26 3.43 32
[Adolescent (social > basic)–adult (social > basic)]
Left lateral anterior rostral MPFC 16 42 20 3.39 32
Protagonist: self > other Adolescents
Left postcentral gyrus 24 40 52 4.32 112
Interaction between emotion
and protagonist
Adult [(self social > self basic)–(other social > other basic)]
Left TPJ 42 66 40 3.83 264
Anterodorsal MPFC 14 42 36 3.38* 40
Adolescent [(self social > self basic)–(other social > other basic)]
Anterodorsal MPFC 14 38 44 3.29* 8
*Active at p < .001, uncorrected.
Burnett et al. 1743Figure 3. Main effect of
social emotion (social > basic)
in both groups. Sagittal and
transverse glass brains showing
average group activation for
adults and adolescents. Shown
at p < .005; minimum spatial
extent = 10 voxels; smoothed
with a filter of 6 mm full
width at half maximum at
the second level.
Figure 4. Interaction between
group and emotion: activity in
the left temporal pole ([40
6 26]) resulting from the
contrast [adult (social >
basic)–adolescent (social >
basic)], shown at p < .005
projected onto a sagittal
T1 image; graph showing
parameter estimates in the
left temporal pole for social
and basic emotion relative
to fixation, in both groups;
positive correlation between
age and adjusted BOLD
signal in the left temporal
pole ([40 6 26]) in the
contrast [social > basic]
(r = .572; p < .001).
1744 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 21, Number 9Adult and adolescent [(other social > other basic)–(self
social > self basic)]. No brain regions were signifi-
cantly active for this contrast, in either group.
Regression between Age and Activation to Social >
Basic Emotion
Whole-brain linear regression analysis revealed that ac-
tivity to social > basic emotion was positively correlated
with age in the left temporal pole (MNI coordinates
[40 6 26]; r = .572; p < .001; Figure 4, bottom).
Activity in the contrast social > basic emotion was neg-
atively correlated with age in the left lateral anterior
rostral MPFC (MNI coordinates [16 42 20]; r = .541;
p < .005; Figure 5, bottom).
DISCUSSION
The current fMRI study investigated the neural cor-
relates of social emotion processing in adults and in
adolescents. When participants imagined social versus
basic emotion scenarios featuring either themselves or
their mothers, both adults and adolescents activated the
anterior rostral MPFC. However, there was an interac-
tion between group and condition in the lateral anterior
rostral MPFC such that the adolescent group activated
this region more than did adults for social relative to
basic emotions. The adult group activated a region of
the left temporal pole more for social relative to basic
emotions. The absence of any significant group differ-
ences in participants’ emotion ratings to the scenarios
suggests that the differences in brain activity between
the adult and adolescent groups cannot be accounted
for by differences in performance.
Brain Activations Associated with Social
Emotion in Both Groups
Social emotions, in contrast to basic emotions, require
the ability to represent people’s mental states (mental-
izing). In other words, social emotions require insight
into the mental states of other people—whether they are
physically present, imagined, or perhaps represented by
the concept of societal norms (Moll, de Oliveira-Souza,
et al., 2005; Moll, Zahn, et al., 2005). For example, guilt
is experienced when one believes that one’s actions
warrant disapproval or punishment, or that they have
Figure 5. Interaction between
group and emotion: activity
in the MPFC ([16 42 20])
resulting from the contrast
[adolescent (social > basic)–
adult (social > basic)], shown
at p < .005 projected onto
a sagittal T1 image; graph
showing parameter estimates
of activity in the MPFC for basic
and social emotion relative
to fixation, in both groups;
negative correlation between
age and adjusted BOLD signal
in the MPFC ([16 42 20]) in
the contrast [social > basic]
(r = .541; p < .005).
Burnett et al. 1745caused harm to another individual. In the current study,
both adults and adolescents activated brain regions
known to be involved in mentalizing, namely, the MPFC
and the pSTS/TPJ (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Frith & Frith,
2003; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003), during social versus basic
emotion processing. In a recent review paper, Olsson and
Ochsner (2008) have drawn attention to the overlap
between brain regions involved in social cognition and
in social emotion. The results of the current study concur
with this finding. We found that brain regions involved
in social cognition were also active when imagining
social emotion situations. The current results therefore
support the idea that the neural systems for social emo-
tion and mentalizing share partially overlapping neural
components.
The anterior rostral MPFC, within the region defined
as the mental state attribution region (MNI y-coordinates
from 30 to 60; z-coordinates from 0 to 40; Amodio &
Frith, 2006; Gilbert et al., 2006), was active in both
groups for social versus basic emotion. Our data are
also in agreement with studies of social emotion in
adults, which have reported activity within the MPFC
(Takahashi et al., 2004; Berthoz et al., 2002; Moll et al.,
2002). This supports the notion that a cognitive pro-
cess, that is, a mental state representation, is involved
in imagining social emotion situations (cf. Olsson &
Ochsner, 2008). It should be noted that the implication
of our findings depends on what role the anterior ros-
tral MPFC plays in mentalizing. It has been proposed
that the cognitive role of the MPFC in mentalizing is
to decouple mental states from physical reality (Frith,
2007). An alternative, but not necessarily incompatible,
explanation of the role of the MPFC in mentalizing is
that it represents the motivational relevance of social
behaviors (Moll, Zahn, et al., 2005). Our study was not
designed to distinguish between these possibilities and
further work is needed on the precise role of the MPFC
in social–emotional tasks and the implications for models
of social–cognitive functioning and emotional processing.
Several previous studies have demonstrated activ-
ity within the anterior rostral MPFC in adolescents
during mentalizing tasks relative to control conditions
(Blakemore et al., 2007; Moriguchi et al., 2007; Wang
et al., 2006). The current result extends our understand-
ing of the neural correlates of social emotion processing
to the adolescent population.
Figure 6. Adult and adolescent activity in the MPFC in the contrast [(self social > self basic)–(other social > other basic)], shown at p < .005
on sagittal glass brain projections. The adult interaction in the left TPJ, containing the region showing a three-way interaction, can also be
seen. Parameter estimates are shown for both emotion and both protagonist conditions (all relative to fixation) in the MPFC, in adults and
adolescents. In both groups, this anterodorsal region of the MPFC is most active in self-social emotions.
1746 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 21, Number 9Adults and adolescents also activated the pSTS/TPJ for
social versus basic emotion, with activity greater on the
left than on the right. The left TPJ is consistently ac-
tivated during mentalizing tasks, and is thought to play
a role in reasoning about the beliefs of others (Samson,
Apperly, Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004; Frith & Frith,
2003; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). The pSTS/TPJ is also
activated during mentalizing in adolescents (Blakemore
et al., 2007; Moriguchi et al., 2007). Activity within this
region in the social relative to basic emotion condition
may be related to the need for representing or reason-
ing about other people’s beliefs when imagining social
versus basic emotion situations.
Differences in Social Emotion Processing
between Adults and Adolescents
Although both age groups activated the anterior rostral
MPFC for social versus basic emotion, a more lateral
part of the anterior rostral MPFC was activated for this
contrast by the adolescent group, but not by the adult
group. This region was contiguous with the region ac-
tivated by adolescents in the main effect of social ver-
sus basic emotion. Activity to social emotion relative
to basic emotion at this locus was also negatively cor-
related with age. Our results therefore suggest that, as
well as showing greater activity than adults within parts
of the MPFC for social versus basic emotion, adoles-
cents also activate a greater volume of the MPFC for
social emotion processing. This result is consistent with
recent developmental neuroimaging studies looking at
other aspects of social cognition, such as thinking about
how intentions cause behavior (Blakemore et al., 2007)
and understanding the intended meanings of sarcastic
remarks (Wang et al., 2006). These studies demon-
strated an age-related decrease in activity in social rela-
tive to control conditions in the anterior rostral MPFC,
in a similarly lateral dorsal location to that found in the
current study (see Blakemore, 2008 for meta-analysis).
This result is also consistent with studies that report
more extensive activation of the PFC in adolescents
compared with adults for nonsocial tasks (e.g., Durston
et al., 2006). The pattern of relative activity in the lateral
dorsal MPFC is also consistent with the idea that activity
to basic emotion as well as social emotion may develop
during adolescence. Previous fMRI studies have shown
that neural activity to facial expressions of basic emotion
changes during adolescence (Yurgelun-Todd & Killgore,
2006; Monk et al., 2003).
The left temporal pole demonstrated a significant
Group by Condition interaction (Figure 4) such that the
adult group showed more activation in this region than
did adolescents for social versus basic emotion process-
ing. Activity to social versus basic emotion in the left
temporal pole was also positively correlated with age.
The temporal poles are thought to store abstract social
knowledge (Frith, 2007; Zahn et al., 2007). The current
result therefore suggests that adults might use social
semantic knowledge when thinking about guilt and em-
barrassment situations.
One possible interpretation of the difference in acti-
vation pattern between the groups is that, during child-
hood and adolescence, a greater degree of mental state
attribution (or, more effortful and less automatic men-
tal state attribution) may be required to generate social
emotions. In adulthood, perhaps mentalizing plays a
less prominent role in experiencing social emotions.
This might be because accumulated social experience
is greater in adults so social semantic knowledge (rep-
resented in the temporal poles) can be relied upon
more heavily. Alternatively, it could be the case that in
adults, MPFC-based mentalizing is more automatic, lead-
ing to more efficient recruitment of this brain region
(Durston et al., 2006).
It is interesting to note that the parameter estimates
for the interactions between group and emotion (shown
in Figures 2, 4, 5, and 6) are often negative relative to
activity in the fixation baseline, particularly in the MPFC.
Many studies have reported similarly higher activity
in the MPFC during low-level baseline conditions than
during more demanding task conditions. It has been
suggested that activity within the MPFC (together with
the precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex) reflects a de-
fault mode in which, in the absence of more demanding
task demands, subjects are free to reflect on themselves
(Gusnard & Raichle, 2001). Amodio and Frith (2006)
have also suggested that during baseline participants
might indulge in spontaneous mentalizing (reflecting
on their own and other people’s mental states) and this
causes the elevated MPFC activation. Therefore, the key
result to note in the current study is that activity within
certain portions of the MPFC is greater in social versus
basic emotion in adolescents than in adults.
Brain Activations Associated with
Self/Other Processing
In the current study, participants imagined emotion
scenarios either from a first-person (self) or a third-
person (mother) perspective. This additional factor was
included because previous studies in adults and ado-
lescents have shown that neural activity to emotion
and semantic knowledge respectively differs between
self and other perspectives (Pfeifer et al., 2007; Ruby
& Decety, 2004). In the current study, thinking about
emotion from a first-person versus third-person perspec-
tive resulted in activation in the right postcentral gyrus
in adolescents. Activation of this region is consistent
with previous studies (Ruby & Decety, 2004), and may
be related to imagining the sensory consequences of
emotional scenarios.
A region of the MPFC showed a significant interac-
tion between protagonist and emotion in both groups.
This region of the MPFC was similarly located in both
Burnett et al. 1747groups, and was more anterodorsal than the main foci
of activation to social versus basic emotion and self
versus other processing. Inspection of the parameter
estimates for this region revealed that, in both groups,
the anterodorsal MPFC was most active to social emo-
tion in the first-person perspective.
We also found a significant region of activation in
the left TPJ for the three-way interaction between emo-
tion, protagonist, and group. Although the left TPJ was
more active for social versus basic emotion in the ado-
lescent group, the adult group showed highest activa-
tion of this region for basic emotion in the third-person
perspective and for social emotion in the first-person
perspective. The role of this brain region in thinking
about others’ beliefs has been highlighted in adult
neuroimaging and lesion studies (Samson et al., 2004;
Frith & Frith, 2003). The differential recruitment of the
left TPJ in adults and adolescents in the current study
may indicate that different cognitive strategies are be-
ing used for the attribution of social and basic emo-
tions to self and other. For a given emotion, the left TPJ
seems to differentiate better between self and other in
adults than it does in adolescents. A possible interpre-
tation of these data, which has been proposed else-
where (Moriguchi et al., 2007), is that adolescents rely
more heavily on a simulation-based strategy when im-
agining another person’s emotional response than
adults do. It is notable that this difference in brain ac-
tivity occurred despite a lack of group difference in per-
ceived self–mother similarity (see Results).
Role of the MPFC in Social Cognitive Development
An interesting perspective on the role of the MPFC in
social cognition has recently been raised in the adult
lesion and neuroimaging literature. Although the MPFC
is robustly activated by mentalizing tasks, and adults
presenting with MPFC lesions usually show mentalizing
deficits (Frith & Frith, 2003; see Frith, 2007), there is
one report of an individual who suffered extensive bi-
lateral MPFC damage during adulthood but who was
unimpaired on mentalizing tasks (Bird, Castelli, Malik,
Frith, & Husain, 2004). The MPFC is not specifically acti-
vated when adults make semantic discriminations among
abstract social concepts, such as ‘‘brave’’ or ‘‘stingy’’
(Zahn et al., 2007). Rather, this task relies on the supe-
rior temporal poles. In addition, a small number of social
emotion studies in adults fail to find MPFC activation,
but do find activity within other regions of the social
brain network such as the STS and the temporal poles,
as well as in more ventral and/or anterior prefrontal
regions such as the fronto-polar and orbito-frontal cortex
(Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, et al., 2005; Moll, Zahn, et al.,
2005; Takahashi et al., 2004). The current study, as well as
previous studies, found greater MPFC activity in adoles-
cents than in adults for social cognition tasks relative
to control conditions (Blakemore et al., 2007; Pfeifer
et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2006). This suggests that acti-
vation of the MPFC for a particular social cognition task
may lessen with age. Reasons for this could include the
accumulation of social experience and the use of alter-
native cognitive strategies.
Further work is needed on the development during
adolescence of the cognitive strategies used for under-
standing people. For example, we do not know whether
the type of mentalizing needed for social emotion un-
derstanding changes with development. It may be the
case that a more explicit mentalizing process is needed
to learn about social emotions initially, but that more
scripted, heuristic, or intuitive strategies are employed
later on (Haidt, 2001).
Another factor which may contribute to a change in
the role of the MPFC with age is anatomical brain devel-
opment. Volumetric MRI studies show that gray matter
volume in social brain regions such as the MPFC and the
TPJ decreases during adolescence, whereas white matter
volume increases (Shaw et al., 2008; Gogtay et al., 2004;
Giedd et al., 1999; Paus et al., 1999; Sowell et al., 1999).
These changes are thought to be due to synaptic prun-
ing and axonal myelination, respectively (see Blakemore,
2008), and may result in increased coordination between
components of the social brain network and greater pro-
cessing efficiency within brain regions mediating social
cognition.
Conclusion and Implications
This fMRI study shows that the neural processing of
social emotion from a first- and third-person perspec-
tive develops between adolescence and adulthood.
Although components of the social brain network in-
cluding the MPFC were active in both groups, adoles-
cents activated the lateral rostral MPFC more for social
versus basic emotion, whereas adults did not. Adults
activated the left temporal pole more for social versus
basic emotion than did adolescents. These results indi-
cate that the neural processing of social emotion con-
tinues to develop between adolescence and adulthood,
such that the predominant activity moves from anterior
(MPFC) to more posterior (temporal) regions with age.
Further work is needed to ascertain how this is related
to neuroanatomical development within social brain re-
gions, and to changes in cognitive strategy resulting
from developing social ability and experience. Our study
was conducted only with female participants; whether
there are gender differences in social emotion process-
ing and its development is an empirical question.
We have shown that adolescents and adults use a sim-
ilar neural network for social emotion processing, but
with relative differences. What is the functional rele-
vance of this developmental shift across adolescence?
In the current experiment, our aim was not to find be-
havioral differences between the age groups. Indeed,
it was important that performance between groups was
1748 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 21, Number 9matched because, had performance differed between
groups, it would have been impossible to interpret any
differences in neural activity, which might have been
a cause or a consequence of differences in task per-
formance. Very few empirical behavioral studies have
reported significant behavioral development during ad-
olescence that is specific to social cognition and which
cannot be explained by general improvement in at-
tention, concentration, memory, and so on. The reasons
for this are probably multifactorial. One possibility is
that, in the lab, adolescents are able to pass complicated
social cognitive tasks, which in everyday life they do
not accomplish successfully. More naturalistic para-
digms might be useful in addressing this question.
However, it is important not to try to explain all of ado-
lescent behavior in terms of neuroanatomical changes
or changes in functional activation, as this neglects
important factors such as changes in hormones and
social environment. A challenge for future adolescent
research is to disentangle how these hormonal and
social factors interact with cognitive and neuroanatomi-
cal changes to produce the unique constellation of so-
cial behaviors that characterize adolescence.
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